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Abstract: Classification, as is common knowledge, is simultaneously an operation (classer) and an instrument of  knowledge organization 
(classifier), regardless of  more technical or specific designations used in that area of  research, although an operation that ‘naturally’ tran-
scends the very realm of  knowledge organization (KO) to which it descended from the logos. In this text, a summary of  more than 35 
years of  work, the author presents a series of  hypothesis and itineraries of  declassified thought, a way of  thinking based on strategies of  
reflexivity and pluralism that buttress the automatic, hierarchical and essentialist tendencies enhanced by totalitarian mind, whether this be 
harsh or subtle, which are imposed by all levels of  power in order to re-orientate them towards civic commitment, re-politicization of  KO 
practices that were never depoliticized. Declassification is a hermeneutics of  KO that recuperates criticism, rhetoric, reflection, emotions, 
affection and even contradiction as the cornerstones of  systematic knowledge production processes. The world is not only full of  hetero-
geneous knowledge but also heterogeneous forms of  knowing that must be restored and deliberated upon on an equal basis. That is the 
aim of  declassification on putting forward an open and alternative interpretation of  rethinking and practising identity, culture, memory or 
social sciences and KO, particularly in the new digital space of  unlimited interaction. 
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1.0 Introduction: classification and  
symbolic violence 
 
The classification of  the human exomemory, thousands 
of  years before the advent of  specific devices for orga-
nizing repositories of  knowledge, was already a powerful 
strategy of  the logos for ordering the world (ordo: ruling 
and control) by means of  essentialist demarcations and 
ontological purifications in an illusion of  universalism 
and consistency which it would only be able to partially 
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and just barely break through by exercising sensitive self-
surveillance and emancipatory will. 
As a weapon of  domination, classification has always 
formed a part of  territorial and, above all, cultural and 
cognitive colonization projects, lurking behind many acts 
of  symbolic violence, reaching its paranoiac climax in the 
ideology and classified archives of  Nazism. As with any 
other human institution (languages, social organizations, 
beliefs, sciences, etc.), classification becomes inward-
looking so as to defend its colonizing action, revealing to-
talitarian structures and objectives (even ‘authors’ resort 
to a natural ‘authoritarianism’). In one way or another, 
classification usurps, distorts, overlaps, subordinates and 
colonizes the unlimited flow of  sense (semiosis), making 
free movement practically impossible in the world that it 
controls by means of  its categories. 
Furthermore, the inevitability of  classification cannot 
be denied, nor can the good services that it has rendered 
knowledge, for instance, relating to several discoveries 
made by positivist epistemology (despite their severe side 
effects). Nonetheless, and in view of  the great harms that 
hierarchical ordering has brought upon culture, knowl-
edge and human coexistence, in this work what is advo-
cated for is what will be called ‘declassification’, an unde-
fined, fragile and hybrid form of  organization, not op-
posed to defined, strong and essentialist classification but 
as an alternative that embraces it. From this perspective, 
classification would be an exclusionary epistemological 
operation of  categorization, characterized by closed con-
cepts whose ultimate intention (whether the mediator-
classifier is aware or not) is dogmatism.  
Moreover, declassification should be understood as a 
hermeneutic operation involving ideas open to different 
sensibilities whose cornerstone and aim is logical, cul-
tural, social, political or cognitive pluralism. Classification 
veils, divides and separates while declassification reveals, 
aggregates, reunites. 
Neither do I doubt the good intentions, even when 
they have tragic consequences, which are sometimes be-
hind some classifying evaluations promoted by culture: 
Olivé (1999) writes that in Papua New Guinea, when the 
elders of  a certain ethnicity sense their imminent death, 
they ask their family to bury them alive under the manure 
of  their livestock, with only a reed to breathe through. 
Charitable Western doctors—convinced that they are do-
ing the right thing—try to prolong their lives by transfer-
ring them to Australian hospitals and thus preventing 
them from exercising their right to a dignified death (on 
the strength of  being the chosen form). In this remark-
able episode we can see a form of  symbolic violence that 
our classification of  the world, economic model or digital 
technology applies to alien knowledge or worlds with the 
same aim of  ‘saving their lives’. 
Declassification implies adopting a complex perspec-
tive that does not exclude any pre-, post- or para-
epistemological tool. Contradiction, for instance, is a ba-
sic resource that, in specific cases, provides if  not explica-
tions, then powerful intuitions and pragmatic accepta-
tions of  the world which do not conform to traditional 
logic: we want to finish the chocolate cake but we do not 
want it be finished; we want and, then again, do not want 
our children to grow up; on being the same tree, it should 
not change but it does at each and every instant; present 
time has to pass so as to continue to be; thanks to oxy-
gen, our organism lives while it self-incinerates. 
Contradiction is the most taboo concept of  the effec-
tive world for systematic thinking. Nonetheless, it is one 
of  the staunchest allies of  declassification and the subject 
of  the last section of  this essay, where several operative 
strategies that open knowledge to all horizons, contesting 
the three sacred principles of  the logic that governs us 
(which, however, has been challenged by quantum me-
chanics for nearly a century now), will be proposed. 
I venture to say that, in the majority of  statements, con-
cepts and positions, it would be possible to elaborate a 
contradiction, provoke its paradoxical regimen. From Auf-
hebung1 to deconstruction, this means that negativity is at 
the heart of  positivity, in other words, that contradiction 
forms a part—however worthless—of  our factual world. 
For many years now, I have adopted a strategic posture of  
alliance with contradiction. In this way, when conventional 
reason reaches its limit, I rely on contradiction as a post-
epistemological resource (post- or any other prefix would 
do here). Detecting contradictions so as to invalidate or re-
ject a piece of  preceding knowledge (or theory), one of  the 
frequent objectives of  the epistemological battering ram, 
would not be the goal of  declassification. A most atro-
ciously barbaric world gathers pace every day, in spite of  
‘rational’ denunciations, against the logic of  any judicious 
subject. In its desire to explain the world through its con-
tradictory rationale, declassification even favours the fabri-
cation of  laboratory contradictions (such as oxymora, for 
instance, see 4.1 and García Gutiérrez 2007) so as to break 
and extend the limits of  that same knowledge. 
All the aforementioned might be sufficient to de-
nounce the violence of  classification: the act of  classify-
ing does not involve any more than a prescription or pro-
scription, a forcing that leaves little room for appeal. 
Knowledge (the subject, in sum) cannot but vanquish its 
sensibility (its aisthesis2) with the aim of  adjusting itself  to 
the labels provided (as an-aisthesis) by the ‘hierarchy of  
credibility’3 (Becker 1967). But classification also has its 
Achilles heel: it is not only about organizing something in 
consonance with some of  other point of  view, but also 
disorganizing a previous, conceivably invisible system. In 
fact, we decompose a world so as to impose another 
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composition on it; since any new classification involves a 
calculated or spontaneous dismantling of  the area con-
cerned. Therefore, classifying declassifies and declassify-
ing reclassifies: the difference lying in the metacognitive, 
pluralist and explicitly subjective commitment of  declas-
sifying versus the automatism, false objectivism or a pref-
erence for the establishment hierarchy by classification. 
In the same way that a secret file is unclassified so as 
to make it public, we should declassify the complexity of  
the world in order to make it once again accessible to 
knowledge. And this can only be achieved by installing a 
metacognitive tool, of  critical self-vigilance, in our system 
of  reasoning, based on logical pluralism, which is no 
more than a profound conviction of  respect for the 
other, the only logic worthy of  its name, but let us take 
good note: whether it be contemporary, successors or 
predecessors4. 
Attempting to avoid classification, or even just trying 
to sidestep it, is just as utopian as wanting to flee in the 
face of  language or thinking. If  we manage to invalidate a 
system, another takes its place simultaneously. This is so 
because classification is a condition for knowledge. We 
could know with other categories, but this always has to 
be done through categories. Those other categories and 
the concepts that they organize ought to prevent impene-
trability, impermeability, dogmatism, and relativism, and 
endow themselves with open, permeable, self-critical, 
sensitive, plural configurations.  
In Bluebeard’s Castle (1974), George Steiner solemnly 
stated that all that he wrote and thought revolved around 
the Auschwitz catastrophe. History was radically changed 
by the Shoah. Nothing would be the same again. And that 
suffering cannot be rationalized for Auschwitz is beyond 
reason. Mèlich (1998) has conscientiously analyzed the 
work of  Steiner, stating that the key to contemporary 
thinking must be found there: “How can you perform 
Schubert at night, read Rilke in the morning, and torture 
at midday?” The answer to this would be philosophy’s 
greatest challenge5. Today’s philosophers and scientists 
continue to produce knowledge as if  the 20st century, the 
most violent in the history of  mankind, had never ex-
isted. Knowledge organization (KO) should not be an ex-
ception either. 
 
2.0 Reason as a belief 
 
In his Philosophical Fragments (1985), a work as monumental 
as it is modest, with extreme lucidity Kierkegaard took rea-
soning about faith to the unplumbed depths of  the psyche 
only to proclaim it as a paradox. Reason, nonetheless, as an 
instrument for demonstrating anything, although excep-
tionally faith, falls into the inextricable circle of  causality, 
so that, although nobody could deny the Danish philoso-
pher the right, and the incalculable merit, of  reasoning 
about faith in the Creator or faith in general, if  only on the 
strength of  the sacred right of  freedom of  expression, nor 
could he deprive us of  our own right by denying the infal-
libility of  reason as a procedure that affords us access to 
any superior, metaphysical or Absolute place. 
We think what we believe and we believe what we think. 
But what this implies is not a circle, but a subtle spiral, be-
cause belief  is always prior to inference and imperceptibly 
interferes with it. In all cultures, belief  is dependent on 
thought from childhood, and a ‘rational’ adult will only ‘be-
lieve’ in his or her rationality, one deeply rooted in belief. 
Many may suffer from (contradictory) paraconsistent bipo-
larity, since, while believing in reason, they also believe in 
mythologies with which it is incompatible. 
But beliefs in theories and great narratives have sus-
tained imaginaries throughout history: with the same 
force that, for the aboriginal people, the clan-based taboo 
of  exogamy and the totem were erected (Freud 1995), in 
other places the Ptolemaic sublunary world was imposed 
for many centuries on those living before Copernicus. 
Likewise, Copernicus’ heliocentric model fulfilled the ex-
pectations of  multitudes and generations. The theory of  
relativity still offers us the most plausible explication for 
the macrocosm, although in conflict with quantum me-
chanics. Faith and reason exchange discreet keys. Here 
follow several explanations. 
 
2.1 Metonymic reduction 
 
Metonymic reduction is an epistemological practice that 
identifies the part with the whole. The daily classification of  
Western collective imaginary of  the world is an expression 
of  a ‘metonymic’ rationality which belongs to the instru-
mental reason censured by Weber or the Frankfurt School 
itself. Metonymic reduction is the reduction of  reductions, a 
reduction whose only aim is to reduce, simplify, and frag-
ment; a reduction overwhelmingly present in the processes 
of  understanding, enunciation and classification favoured 
by the dominant form of  contemporary rationality.  
Cultures are built and maintained on the basis of  im-
mutable categories, prejudices and suppositions, and 
metonymics facilitates enormously the constitution and 
transmission of  that world on offering it in partial visions 
and mutilating biases. Metonymics follows the progres-
sive path of  reduction of  the world to the extent of  con-
verting it into a handful of  slogans and clichés. It is for 
this reason that the metonymic language of  marketing 
and advertising, which has already infiltrated the dis-
courses produced in Western culture, from the political to 
the purely scientific, is so efficient. To such an extent, in 
fact, that the exceptionality of  the use of  metonymics has 
become a commonplace cognitive tool, automatic and, 
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therefore, scarcely detectable but overwhelmingly present 
in our daily discourses, choices and actions. 
The Portuguese sociologist Boaventura Santos (2005, 
155-56) considers that metonymic reason is a form of  ra-
tionality that imposes: “a homogeneity on the whole and 
the parts, which do not exist beyond the relationship with 
the totality…. So it is incomprehensible that some of  the 
parts have their own life beyond the whole …. Western 
modernity, dominated by metonymic reason, not only has a 
limited understanding of  the world but also of  itself.” The 
conviction, so firmly rooted in the West, of  assigning a 
universal value to a strictly local and contemporary world-
view has penetrated not only in the daily imaginary of  
westerners but also in pro-Western and fringe cultures, in 
many cases by means of  the silent and gradual adoption of  
those same Western worldviews, technologies and lan-
guages. 
Two immediate cognitive actions are produced through 
metonymic reason: 
 
– The fragmentation and division of  all the instances so 
as to be studied, dominated and exploited by parts like 
the human body, invaded cultures, or the Western 
agencies themselves at the service of  an essentialist 
supra-Western efficiency, as occurs in the field of  sci-
ence, politics, values or the division of  labour. 
– The promotion of  an arbitrary logic that, far beyond 
Morin’s hologrammatical principle (2008), involves 
identifying the division with the whole of  which it was 
just a part. Thus, classes and parts are regarded in an 
uncontrolled process as species and wholes, and that 
such a logic begins to operate in daily practices as an 
ebullient epistemological flow. In the forest of  classi-
fied knowledge, each tree, trunk and branch would oc-
cupy an unquestionable place. 
 
2.2 Dichotomic reduction 
 
Once it has obtained the license of  metonymic produc-
tion, classifying thought arms itself  with two keen prop-
erties: 
 
– Sliding: this involves a kind of  uncontrollable move-
ment that allows us to pass unjustifiably from one in-
stance to another for the mere fact of  possessing ho-
monymous, homographic and homophonic represen-
tations. Lacan used to underline the effect of  meto-
nymic sliding across the structure of  signifiers them-
selves. The discursive situation is undoubtedly respon-
sible for the sliding that occurs in one direction or an-
other. But, despite being generated on the surface of  
meaning, the effects on this (for understanding or for 
enunciation) could not be more decisive. 
– Dichotomization: dichotomy offers a world constructed 
by means of  opposing pairs. All instances are con-
structed on an opposite reference. True enough: di-
chotomies produce knowledge, but only dichotomic 
knowledge. What is paradoxical is that this reductive 
cognitive mode has ended up absorbing other more 
complex modes. Its nature is based on the following 
properties: 
 
1) Binarism: subjectivity expresses experiences and per-
ceives the world in conceptual pairs: good or bad, 
faithful or unfaithful, man or woman, master or slave, 
North or South. Symbolic comprehension, automation 
and submission are favoured on reducing alternatives 
to a binary polarization. 
2) Opposition: those pairs, not necessarily harmonic or 
sympathetic, offer themselves up as an expression of  
tension or conflict, thus legitimizing it: good versus bad, 
faithful versus unfaithful, man versus woman, North versus 
South. 
3) Subordination: the pair’s order would not be neutral 
but determined by a hegemonic criterion: good over 
bad, faithful over unfaithful, man over woman, North 
over South. 
4) Generalization and negative exclusion: in certain di-
chotomies, the subordinate element is presented dis-
missively as a negation of  the subordinating instance 
that initializes the pair, by means of  prefixes such as in-
(fidel), un-(loyal), non-(believers), ab-(normal), etc., the 
denied instance habitually representing a larger or more 
diverse world than that which is represented by the de-
nying instance: Christians/infidels (Muslims, Animists, 
Buddhists, atheists, agnostics, etc.), normal/abnormal, 
and even classified/declassified, however much declassi-
fication embraces classification as another mode of  or-
ganization, but not vice versa. 
 
After dichotomies comes a crushing logical order that I 
think that, to differ from the opinion of  Santos, is not ex-
clusive, even less so of  Western culture, but rather a con-
stant in any culture or personality that seeks domination 
and expansion. And such an order impregnated morals: 
good/bad; law: innocent/guilty; politics: in favour/against; 
digital technology: 1/0. 
I will end this section with an illustrative example 
which allows us to rethink the ordinary in extraordinary 
situations: In the excellent film XXY (name of  a chro-
mosome), by the Argentine moviemaker Lucía Puenzo 
(2007), Alex—a teenager classified as intersexual or her-
maphrodite by medical taxonomies—is asked by her/his 
father (Ricardo Darín), anxious because of  the physical 
and psychic violence suffered by the adolescent, in order 
to know when and what sex will she/he finally choose, 
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male or female: “Dad, what if  there were nothing to 
choose?,” Alex (choosing) answered him. 
 
2.3 Analogical reduction 
 
As Umberto Eco stated in Kant and the Platypus (2000), 
which, in my opinion, is his best work on knowledge the-
ory, with repercussions that cannot be ignored by experts 
in KO, British zoologists spent a part of  the 19th century 
debating on how to classify the platypus, a likeable animal 
discovered for Western biology by colonists in Australia 
and New Zealand. The aborigines had already made this 
discovery thousands of  years before and had never ar-
gued about its zoological classification. The platypus has 
a duck’s beak and lays eggs (bird), a furry tail and strange 
mammary glands (mammal), it slithers and has claws 
(reptile), in addition to spending half  of  its life in aquatic 
environments where it hunts and obtains sustenance 
(amphibian). After much debate, the zoologists arrived at 
the conclusion that the animal should be regarded as a 
mammal. They had to make a choice and decided on that 
taxonomy, although how could they explain, among other 
things, the matter of  the eggs and beak? 
Several zoologists, according to Eco, made extravagant 
comments as regards the platypus, for instance regarding 
its position in the animal order: mammals with parts of  
other animals or an exceptional mutation. Recent discover-
ies show that the platypus belongs to a species that, for 
millions of  years, has been regressing towards its involu-
tion. And, in fact, the platypus is not composed of  ‘bits’ of  
other animals, but other animals possess ‘bits’ of  the platy-
pus. 
Comparing formal Kantian categories with the Peircian 
concept of  thirdness, Eco expounds upon the cultural im-
perative, how taxonomies are reproduced through mecha-
nisms of  recognition, taking the famous example of  Marco 
Polo when, on seeing an Asian rhinoceros for the first time 
during his journey to the East, classified it as a unicorn be-
cause of  its resemblance to a known animal that, for an-
other thing, had never existed except in mythological nar-
rative and paintings that Polo himself  had had the chance 
to familiarize himself  with in Venice. 
George Kleiber (1990) talks about a semantics of  pro-
totypes that operates mentally by degrees of  analogy, far-
removed from the world of  scholarship, in ‘ordinary’ 
people and which can help us to understand analogism at 
all levels and as regards all issues as a mode of  mental 
configuration of  the world. Although this may seem non-
sense for zoologists, when a non-specialist talks about 
mammals, he or she associates them with, for instance, 
cows or lions, rarely with whales or mice, and never with 
platypuses, due to their aspect. In the same way as there is 
a greater concurrence with a prototype, there are also 
situations or objects that distance themselves. For a zo-
ologist, a whale is not a fish (since it is a mammal), al-
though for ‘ordinary’ people a whale could be regarded as 
being more a fish than a lion, or even an eel (the latter be-
ing taxonomically a fish). However, ‘far less’ a fish than a 
whale would, for the dominant analogical automatism, 
always be an otter or a platypus. We are all ignorant and 
audacious classifiers outside our own territory: a sociolo-
gist would succumb to sliding analogies beyond his or her 
specialization (classifying, for example, plants as edible 
and inedible), since he or she is only capable of  self-
monitoring the strict structures of  his or her own ‘disci-
pline’; and a botanist would make a mess of  the family re-
lationships so cherished by ethnographers. 
The degrees of  constant analogical adscription of  all 
instances with respect to master categories is a fact that 
ends up by transforming prototypes into stereotypes 
(Abril 2013). Stereotypes invade concepts and nullify 
their reliability, although they promulgate an efficient 
logic of  classification that, inexplicably, reason tends not 
to reject. In fact, many types of  racist behaviour would 
respond to that stereotype. And the answers would be a 
resounding ‘yes’ or an outright ‘no’, when on many occa-
sions we would like them to be vague, equivocal: yes-but, 
no-but or even yes-but-no, yes-and-no. 
In the same vein, the notion of  encyclopaedia put for-
ward by Eco (2001) acquires relevance. For Eco, an ency-
clopaedia is a mental place that contains all the possible 
experiences concerning a given semiotic instance, naturally 
in the personal and non-transferrable place of  each sub-
ject. So, transmitting or receiving a message about Brazil, 
London, mice or cars projects the full personal encyclo-
paedia of  a subject which, in some way, would coincide 
with the anamnestic baggage of  another subject. For in-
stance, Brazilians and Londoners, or whoever has had a 
bad experience with mice or cars, will project those con-
cepts in a very different way than people who have never 
visited those places, whose knowledge boils down to what 
they have read or what other people have told them. 
Reducing to stereotypes cannot be overcome when the 
classifying intention enters a transitive meaning shift and is 
now incapable of  remembering the primary meaning or 
functionality. James Clifford (1997) related that the Port-
land Art Museum intended to reclassify the Rasmussen 
Collection of  ‘Native’ Art by consulting several Inuit clan 
representatives from whence the objects came. Far from 
answering satisfactorily the questions posed by the mu-
seum’s curators on the origins, functions or traditions of  a 
mask or harpoon, the Inuits confined themselves to telling 
stories and singing songs based on the memories evoked 
by those objects, which for them had no artistic or anthro-
pological value, let alone as collection items. During the 
three days of  meetings, they exchanged memories and as-
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serted claims, became depressed and laughed, without con-
tributing any classifying element that served the interests 
of  the exhibition. What perverse logic could possibly lie 
behind that paternalist strategy in which the classifiers con-
sult their classified individuals? 
Several civilizations and cultures, for instance, subcul-
tures that are not necessarily territorial, such as the scien-
tific kind, have specialized in ‘hetero-classification’, in 
drawing up lists of  clichés with which the classified sub-
jects and objects have to comply, knowing full well that 
the inclusion of  all the subjects and objects in the same 
category is usually contrived, or that the category ends up 
by shattering due to internal pressure or because of  the 
dynamics themselves of  the restless world that it intends 
to subordinate. 
Epistemological and scientific categories, especially in 
the social and human sciences, are not prepared to as-
sume constant change from a totalist supra-ordering. In 
daily life (political, media, community, etc.), analogical re-
duction, along with the dichotomic and metonymic kind, 
would be at the origin of  numerous conflicts and sup-
pressions. 
Together with these three reductions of  classifying 
reason, there operate many other gravitational tendencies 
that, because of  the limited space available, are summa-
rized below: 
 
– Epistemism: this is generated under a dominant para-
digm. In the case of  scientific reason, its rationality 
would adapt at all costs to the meta-scientific rules of  
epistemology, although for Santos, epistemology never 
applies them to itself  (1989). 
– Demarcationism: reason that is only capable of  con-
structing knowledge from the disjunctions between 
cultures, nations, clans, communities, subjectivities or 
any other kind of  ontological demarcation. Essential-
ism would also be one of  those uncontrollable and in-
explicable ‘rational pulsations’. 
– Aestheticism: reason that yields to protocols, stan-
dards, formalisms, stabilities, organizations, processes, 
and repudiates aesthesias (sensibilities) and algies (suf-
ferings). Normativism is derived from aestheticism 
that is intruded by and intrudes upon everything else. 
The same can be said for the contagious mimicry of  
the new (Groys 2014) that, in few years, makes us see 
clothes, hairstyles, cars, technology or our own face as 
ridiculous. 
– Coherentism: consistent way of  thinking that pro-
scribes its chief  enemy: contradiction.  
 
Everything has to fit in a story, forcibly if  need be. Noth-
ing is easier to decry than contradiction in the forming of  
reason. It is sometimes so evident that its denunciation 
seems indecent. All the eristic masters, from Aristotle to 
Seneca, from the sophists to the aphorisms of  Schopen-
hauer, took it upon themselves to establish systems keyed 
to demonstrating this. But the uneasiness provoked by 
contradiction is generated by the very act of  reasoning 
that wants to, but cannot, free itself  of  rich impurities 
and indispensable irrational, emotional and affective ge-
nealogies. All these reasons, as can be seen, strengthen, 
traverse and contradict one another. 
 
3.0 Epistemic obstacles 
 
Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte listened with curiosity to 
Laplace’s theory of  the cosmos, warning him that he had 
not mentioned the Creator: “Sire,” he replied, “I never had 
the need of  that hypothesis” (Hottois 2002). In the theo-
logical sphere, Anselm of  Canterbury applied himself  to 
demonstrating the existence of  God through his famous 
ontological argument, while Kant dismantled it with ele-
gant reasoning. Fear of  the Inquisition might have been 
behind the dualism, the clear separation between soul and 
body, religion and science, in many 16th-18th century think-
ers (even Descartes himself  ordered the posthumous pub-
lishing of  several of  his works, including Le Monde, and at 
that time Cartesianism was persecuted). Freer from threat, 
Kierkegaard (1985), as has been seen, resorted to paradox 
so as to justify the impossible explanation for faith through 
reason, and, by the beginning of  the 20th century, the neo-
positivists had already excluded metaphysics from their ob-
jectives: that which cannot be verified empirically should 
not be discussed (Wittgenstein, 1961). In the sphere of  
pragmatism, William James ([1927] 1995) would declare 
himself  to be a Catholic so as to exclude the problem of  
religious faith from his epistemological itinerary, and Rorty 
(1979) took the illusion of  philosophy to the established 
limit lambasting, with good reason, mentalism. With de-
construction, Derrida crossed that limit suspending all ori-
gins and all ends, and in The Logic of  Sense, for Deleuze 
(1990) sense had no logic. At a more sectoral level, Gaston 
Bachelard (1980) proposed the epistemological rupture, 
‘eliminating’ the world and demarcating the purified itiner-
ary of  science versus daily discourses, while Boaventura 
Santos (1989), instigating a second rupture, reinstated 
common sense in a line convergent with that of  sociology. 
Or Jesús Ibáñez (1994) or the ethnomethodology of  
Garfinkel (1967) who, on the basis of  the most radical kind 
of  self-questioning, led Mills (2001) and, above all, Alvin 
Gouldner (1980) to assert an impossible objectivity in so-
cial research. I hope that, with this illustrative background, 
you will allow me make an omission highly pertinent to 
thinking about declassification, an issue to be addressed in 
Section 4, shedding certain epistemological dead weight: 
what is involved is suspending Reality and Truth, since 
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their unproductive presence tends to disrupt the process 
of  declassified inquiry. 
 
3.1 Suspending Reality and Truth 
 
While representativists claim that the mind reflects an ob-
jective exterior reality, radical constructivists sustain that 
such a reality does not exist, since it would be a strict 
mental production. For declassification, this discussion is 
unnecessary. Suspending Reality is a strategy for avoiding 
an ‘Absolute’ of  classification that suppresses our con-
ceptual world. We can name Reality (several religions 
have already done so in their own way), but not talk 
about it or transmit what it supposedly tells us (some-
thing which religions also tend to do with absolute nor-
mality). Among other things, this is so because Reality 
would be a totality from which this world of  awareness, 
at least one, has emerged plausibly from among trillions 
of  other different, convergent or parallel worlds. We will 
never know whether awareness comes into being in a 
specific universe, in several universes or in an infinite 
number of  infinite universes by fate, chance or accident, 
insomuch as to determine this would be akin to encom-
passing the vast totality or speaking from its exterior. 
As it begins to be interfered with by concepts and 
transferred, communicated and substituted by humans, 
they gradually stop perceiving Reality. This does not 
mean to say that Reality does not exist but, simply, that 
the dimension that its offers to intelligent mammals is 
vulnerable and increasingly more vague due to our con-
ceptual mediation (and measuring) and practically extin-
guished by meta-conceptualization, as will be seen further 
on. From the inaccessibility of  the Real only our factual 
world would be left, a world whose perception would also 
be confined by the meta-conceptual apparatus of  each 
culture. In exchange for this necessary suspension, I will 
embrace the hybridist conception of  Latour (1993), ac-
cording to which, and breaking a Cartesian dualism, no 
evident ontological frontier would exist between people 
(subjects) and cars or computers (objects), forasmuch as 
the objects have been designed and made by the subjects, 
who in turn construct themselves on the basis of  the 
very objects that they handle; that is to say, the objects 
and we, the subjects, are hybridizations. 
Who cares about truth if  we live in the normality of  its 
simulacrum? If  we take a look at the varied conceptions of  
truth, the truthful, whose totality is unreachable, is dispen-
sable. The veil of  Māyā, in this case, our conceptual system, 
makes it unnecessary to operate with the reference of  that 
other absolute. Truth was assumed by the powerful by in-
voking stars, divinities, curses and catastrophes so as to 
impose it. The custodians of  truth were lords, sorcerers, 
shamans, clergymen, the guardians who took it upon 
themselves to destroy all that which threatened dogmatism 
and its continuity. Later on, its couriers were the intermedi-
ate institutions (Durkheimean expression) and especially 
the educational, scientific, political and media arenas. 
Truth, therefore, has always been problematic since its 
mythical beginnings. Its condition of  impossibility lies ex-
actly in the need for its conceptual representation. 
If  what we understand by truth is the adaptation and 
correspondence between enunciations and the facts to 
which they refer, what would settle such a relationship 
would be other favourable or unfavourable ones, some-
thing therefore subject to interpretation, bias. Under this 
prism, truth would correspond to the most plausible 
enunciation. Authenticity would, in all cases, be one of  
the substitutes accepted by declassification in absence of  
that universal truth. 
If  we approach truth from another perspective, such 
as the acceptance of  something as truthful, we introduce 
more relentless interferences: an indeterminate number 
of  people that assume the truth of  an enunciation, reach-
ing an agreement that legitimates a position, an incursion 
of  rhetoric so as to demonstrate, through argumentation, 
an enunciation that does not demonstrate itself  or con-
vince the rest of  the world. We would now be under the 
conception of  truth as an agreement, another practical 
vision also assumable for declassified thought. For an 
enunciation or fact, an occurrence that is not free of  
enunciation and, therefore, rhetoric, to be true, we would 
need permanent unanimity, that is, a futile verification. 
And there will always be a subject or culture, or an objec-
tion in a sole subject or culture now or in the future, that 
will invalidate those pretensions. 
In daily life, nobody can be sure of  telling the truth. 
Deception and self-deception are integrated into mental 
structures and our conception of  the world (even animals 
‘deceive’ instinctively to seduce, camouflage themselves or 
intimidate). All generations (also a false concept) have 
thought about the world on the basis of  naïve or deliberate 
deceit and have constructed the world on these founda-
tions. Lies are motivated by survival, instinct, introversion, 
jealousy, greed, desire, shameful interests. But the main 
driver of  falsehood is fear; even fear of  telling the truth. 
The majority of  people lie from self-deception; they 
lie without knowing. A declaration of  sincerity can be, as 
stated by Elster (1988), a perverse way of  gaining cre-
dence with others. Absolute Truth belongs to classifica-
tion, and relative, fragmented truth in construction is not 
absolute Truth. Then what is the point of  appealing to it, 
if  only as a simple rhetorical, opportunist or eristic prac-
tice? The poet Paul Valéry said rightly: self-deception can 
reside in the purest sincerity (1960). 
And one last word of  caution: he that searches for ab-
solute truth (or authenticity or the essence) will only be 
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able to approach it in absolute untruth. Of  untruth, as 
with offence, we can be sure of  its sincerity. Of  truth, as 
with flattery, we should always be in doubt: vituperation 
and scorn have more possibilities of  being sincere. Es-
sentialism will always doubt the genealogical purity. But 
the sole purity would be that of  the hybrid. This being so, 
truth has more conditions of  possibility in what is false. 
 
3.2 On concepts and categories 
 
The history of  the world of  human understanding is the 
history of  concepts and this incessant colonization. It is 
for this reason that the approach of  the so-called ‘post-
colonial studies’ to the field of  KO is of  enormous inter-
est. It might indeed be true, as Hardt and Negri (2000) 
have critically affirmed, that the initial originality of  the 
theorists of  post-colonialism (Bhabha 1994; Spivak 1999; 
Mignolo 2000, etc.) has got bogged down in the mangrove 
swamp of  the old colonial categories about which they 
pretend to caution us and from which they profess to free 
us with their proposals. In fact, I believe that the opposi-
tion of  emic/etic research methods (or even their ‘com-
plementation’ as a way of  achieving ‘objectivity’) is detri-
mental, insomuch as the outside/inside perspective must 
be simultaneous. The difficulty and challenge is to obtain a 
plural and, in any case, hermeneutic perspective. Post-
colonialism habitually takes advantage of  spaces and cul-
tures usurped by foreign powers, but these powers also 
colonize inwardly. The post-colonial discourse should be 
complemented by post-colonial strategies, if  only from a 
now insufficient geopolitical standpoint, even though we 
do not know how to think outside the conception of  fron-
tier, as claimed by Kymlicka (1995). 
Colonial processes neither start nor end in mere territo-
rial or cultural invasions. Both the biophysical world and 
the universe of  knowledge are products of  unlimited 
recolonizations, be they deliberate or fortuitous. No living 
organism manages to eradicate bacteria because if  it did 
indeed rid itself  of  some of  them, others would take their 
place and, if  it managed to rid itself  of  all of  them, it 
would have transformed itself  into a post-organic organ-
ism, since bacteria themselves are a condition and symp-
tom of  biosystems. The same happens with immaterial in-
stances, such as knowledge or thought, which cannot avoid 
exterior colonization or contamination, because this forms 
a part of  their inexorable evolution. What is important, 
when all is said and done, is that a dominant colonial 
knowledge policy, as in the case at hand, never quite man-
ages to substitute or even eradicate knowledge practices 
regarded as peripheral, nor does it violate the epistemo-
logical limits of  the very production of  knowledge. 
Culture, identity, memory, rationality, information, 
knowledge and its classification would be colonized in-
stances that disseminate colonization. The structures that, 
for Bataille or Althuser, always speak for themselves 
penetrate particularly what and how we know, what we 
classify and organize. Here is one of  the basic theoretical 
challenges of  declassified thought: the production of  an 
open, esthesic, compassionate, heeding knowledge, a self- 
and hetero-decolonizing knowledge. 
We know through concepts that are not exempt, such 
as that of  the aforementioned bacteria, through unex-
plored yearnings for colonization. We colonize by know-
ing, stating and organizing knowledge by means of  con-
cepts. Through closed, resemanticized and updated con-
cepts, we supposedly narrate open and remote stories. By 
dint of  rigid concepts, we predict flexible futures. By vir-
tue of  static concepts, we discover flows and changes. It 
is known concepts that take the unknown hostage. 
Hence, a decolonizing conscience, with which the theory 
of  KO cannot afford to dispense, would have to oversee 
any inevitably colonizing movement, above all if  it is in-
volutive. This would be an expressible teleological para-
dox with the peerless strength of  an oxymoron: declassi-
fying as a decolonizing re-colonizing project. 
The world’s instances intertwine like rhizomes, with 
spontaneous ruptures, unimaginable and hazardous ab-
sences and alliances, and it is the logos that makes them 
harmonic, determinist and self-referential by closing ranks 
with concepts whose abysmal interstices and flows of  their 
porosities are concealed by grammars, contexts and prag-
matic uses. If  we say a thousand million, a hundred million 
or even a hundred people, our mind simulates a conceptual 
image which it is essential to evade immediately so as not 
to be overwhelmed by an unending brevity, an unlimited 
laconism. We operate with deliberately vague images, even 
for something so supposedly specific, but topically unap-
proachable, as a two-digit figure. 
We cannot even have a Cartesian, precise, clear and 
distinct idea of  the open, intertwined and vast world rep-
resented by 10 miles or just a hamlet. We are incapable of  
simultaneously grasping the totality or density of  our 
own home, workplace or specialization. We shift lineally, 
precariously and discontinuously through those closed 
concepts with pretentions of  totality, but when we catch 
hold of  a small part, the rest escapes us as does totality it-
self, which would never be equal to the sum of  its parts, 
also totalities, and not even to the totality that was or 
could be at an instant or from another perspective. 
With surprising naturalness, we are capable of  apply-
ing ourselves to using concepts that speak of  possible in-
stances only because they dare to invoke them. Protected 
by these objections, we cannot even adhere to the old and 
comfortable nominalist dilemma. For nominalism, uni-
versals do not exist: woman, humanity, slavery, etc., but 
rather there exist specific entities: women, people, slaves, 
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although what are these now reckonable entities if  not 
still inconceivable instances (and all this without taking 
into account the quantum universe)? The problem of  
universals would not lie then in the impossible idea that 
leads us to a general concept, but in the impossibility of  
any specific concept that pretends to close the world to 
which it refers. What coincidence would there be between 
two casual interlocutors with different experiences of  the 
conception of  Rio de Janeiro; or one of  its districts, 
streets or palaces, or a modest family living in a favela? 
Would it be possible to grasp in one word, phrase, book, 
or library the complexity of  all the historical intersec-
tions, magnitudes or complex associations comprising 
Rio or any of  its subcomponents in space or time? What 
diverse and apprehensible world represents the concept 
of  Carioca, Brazilian or Latin American, beyond a figure 
and a number of  unequally shared attachments or memo-
ries? Even though they did not resemble modern Brazil-
ians, were the inhabitants of  Brazil 100, 500 or 3,000 
years ago Brazilian? Will these inhabitants be Brazilian in 
10 centuries’ time? How does the diachronic and syn-
chronic diversity of  a place, its society and the genera-
tions that have lived there register a closed conception? 
Will a concept register trajectories and changes? Are not 
trajectories and changes a part of  the conception of  the 
world? What precise meaning do the concepts of  society, 
subject or generation, for instance, have in a trajectory or 
change? Is a photogram, a two-dimensional concept, suf-
ficient to express an escape, cause, finality, meaning, 
doubt, contradiction or opening? If  insufficient, how can 
we possibly overcome such a semic lacuna and be capable 
of  closing and classifying concepts? By means of  rough 
and anaesthetic brushstrokes, classification resolves what 
for declassified thinking is an unstoppable flow and per-
ceptive sensitive vocation. The taxonomies that we elabo-
rate are, in reality, metaphysical taxidermies. 
The problem does not lie then in the impossibility of  
universals, as claimed by the nominalists, but in the impos-
sibility of  the concepts themselves as closed entities sub-
missive to closed structures. Limits, although we possess 
many of  them, are not mental but epistemological. The 
human mind has proven over and over again to transgress 
the closed conception of  the world in revolutions, heuris-
tics, art, and even in the pragmatic resolution of  daily di-
lemmas. 
The world that we perceive is made up of  a number 
of  materials to which we give names (Olson 2002). These 
materials do not have a hierarchy. Only names and con-
cepts happen and are organized in a hierarchy in that 
huge and unquestionable legacy which is culture. The ma-
terials from which the world is built, and to which we 
give names, are not made of  themselves, but of  other 
materials to which, at some moment and scale of  compo-
sition, we now cannot give names, but, notwithstanding, 
they do not cease to determine the nature of  the former, 
even more so than accessible and named materials. 
Unnameable or unnamed materials participate and are 
participated by named materials. But they belong to other 
worlds and, on many occasions, other dimensions. An 
ape would never be able to explain to itself  what the vi-
rus responsible for its extinction was like. A virus would 
never have access to the world of  the ape, although it is 
responsible for its death. But a virus is also alien to the 
materials that give or deprive it of  life. And those materi-
als, of  whose biocondition we will soon lose the notion, 
would be fuel for the unknown instances that harass, 
condition, and suspend them. 
Wholes and parts never simultaneously cease being 
parts and wholes, as causes and effects never cease being 
effects and causes that flow in all dimensions and direc-
tions, destroying and reconstructing meaning. If  it man-
aged to escape from all pretence of  subordinating mean-
ing and start accompanying it with uncertainty and para-
consistency, the main obstacle for classification would 
thus be overcome. But then we would not be practicing 
classification but declassified thinking. 
While concepts are notions, instances that allow us to 
interact mentally and directly with the world, categories 
would be concepts that organize other concepts, namely, 
metaconcepts, notions that supra-organize, subordinate, 
and associate concepts. Under our prism, a category would 
not be merely formal or neutral, but full and involved. 
When we insert a supra-ordering metacognitive practice 
in the conception of  the world to which we refer, to wit, an 
intentional perspective over our perspective, a word over 
our word, a conception over another conception, we are 
categorizing. We will call metaconcepts several concepts 
whose primary functionality of  understanding the world 
transmutes into a secondary, although directive, functional-
ity of  understanding other concepts. Such an action, unno-
ticed in daily life, would be decisive for cognitive develop-
ment, the loss of  Reality, and the domination of  the planet. 
With the liberation and dissemination of  meta-
resources, on the basis of  the metalogos, humans dedi-
cated their time to dominating their own cognitive tool, 
taking an enormous leap forward in the opposite direction 
to Reality, but accompanying this with propitious expedi-
tions and conquests in their own world. In Western culture, 
science is the high priest and custodian of  the metalogos, 
the production of  categories, and now metacategories, re-
sources ‘meta”, which increasingly widen the divide. 
 
3.3 Deepness and concretion 
 
To know more; to know it all. We are approaching with 
obscene slowness the far beyond and the here and now. 
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But how deeply will we quench our thirst? A complicated 
dilemma: Valéry also stated, to our disappointment (1960, 
215): “la profondeur est dans la peau.” 
Deepness would then be more than an optical effect of  
a situated psychism. Deepness would be a metaphor and a 
relative measurement: as a metaphor of  the physical world, 
it is associated with notions of  height or abysm. As a rela-
tive measurement, the degree of  deepness depends on the 
physical position of  the observer. To generalize is to make 
a statement of  universal value (woman), although to spec-
ify is also to make a generalization but with a local value 
(this woman). The languages that we use never hesitate to 
promote generalization as a default value of  their struc-
tures. It would be impossible to say what is to generalize or 
to specify without generalizing. The concretion ‘this 
woman’ also contains and paradigmatically opens up to a 
generic universe, but syntagmatically (at the hub of  its as-
sociations) it houses other universes that complicate mat-
ters, as does “this American woman, Californian, New 
Yorker … even ‘this Jane.’” 
On the basis of  the impossibility of  specifying, the 
system leaves us the generalizing algorithm for any other 
circumstance. And we see that, effectively, generalization 
works and redeems us. Generalization is analgesic, anaes-
thetic, amnesic (for that reason some inconveniences and 
memories can be tolerated by individuals). 
Such a generalizing logic glides through the confines of  
thought, legitimizing itself  in practice to such an extent 
that the most specific would simultaneously be the most 
general. And, in our eyes, the most profound would be the 
most superficial. Consequently, an explanation makes such 
an abusive use of  generalization that has difficulty escaping 
from contradiction. The thicker the brushstroke is, the 
smaller the chance we will apparently have of  erring. How-




The following paragraphs will cover a number of  declas-
sifying tools of  a different nature stationed on the aban-
doned frontiers and peripheries of  our cognitive and 
post-cultural matrix, fundamentally in pluralistic, para-
consistent and ontologically hybrid places. Declassifica-
tion, with its indirect and fragile resources, would not 
only allow for an alternative re-description of  voracious 
transculture, but would also provide individuals and 
communities tools for resisting, appropriating and reclas-
sifying within it.  
 
4.1 Some post-epistemological resources 
 
Conventional classification is based on an underlying di-
chotomic logic from which spring hierarchizations an-
chored to a particular vision indifferent to cultural, ideo-
logical and cognitive pluralism. Dichotomy would there-
fore be a front open to declassifying action. Several control 
and dichotomic reversion strategies will be briefly covered 
below, while, in the two following sections, a more in-
depth look will be taken at strategies that contain dialogical 
and paraconsistent procedures. As regards the declassifica-
tion of  dichotomies, there are several available options: 
 
– Edgar Morin, on the basis of  his complex methodology 
(2008), suggests conciliating oppositions, regarding 
them as necessary collaborators. So, rather than the op-
posite of  disorder, order would be its inevitable com-
plement: there is no order without disorder, no light 
without darkness, no one side of  a coin without its flip-
side. Even allowing for evident cognitive developments 
and the usefulness, in some cases, of  conciliating oppo-
sitions, this balanced solution sometimes would not go 
beyond the good intentions of  salvaging a couple that 
does not now work or should never have existed. 
– Boaventura Santos advocates for “considering the terms 
of  dichotomies outside the articulations and relation-
ships of  power that unite them, as a first step towards 
freeing them from the said relationships and revealing 
other alternative ones that have been obscured by 
hegemonic dichotomies. To consider the South as if  the 
North did not exist, to consider women as if  men did 
not exist, to consider the slave as if  the slave owner did 
not exist” (Santos 2005,160). In this relevant proposi-
tion, it should be noted that a radical extirpation of  op-
positions, without due precautions, could lead to cogni-
tive reductions or distensions: in many cases, maybe 
‘thinking without’ is no improvement on ‘thinking 
against’. 
– From the deconstruction of  dichotomies, a reconstruc-
tion processus of  oxymora and hyperbatic oxymora (in-
versions) has been developed (García Gutiérrez 2007), 
inducing the cooperation of  the elements of  many 
automatic oppositions, such as centre/periphery, so as 
to transform them into two efficient epistemological 
and heuristic resources: central periphery (Bangalore or 
São Paulo, for instance) and peripheral centre (be it The 
Bronx or the poorest districts of  LA). The calculated 
construction of  oxymora is a powerful metacognitive 
tool of  declassifying thought in certain cases. 
– Finally, multivalency, ambiguity or polysemy can be 
generated in each concept in such a way that dichot-
omy is always overwhelmed or annulled in a controlled 
fashion. The multiplicity of  meaning of  a concept im-
plies a clause of  immediate rupture with its possible 
dichotomies. For instance, in the North/South di-
chotomy, it should be considered that neither absolute 
North nor absolute South exists. Even from the per-
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spective of  industrial development, there is North in 
South and South in North. All concepts generalize 
and, at a certain semic threshold, lapse necessarily into 
self-denial (see 4.3). For declassification, this con-
science of  conceptual precariousness is exceedingly 
relevant. 
 
4.2 Pluralist and dialectic strategies 
 
In this section, which is more applied to and focused on 
sectors related to political, social and cultural stances, I 
am going to describe two types of  operators that, hypo-
thetically, would help to break with unilateral and ho-
mogenizing schemas of  dependence, whose presence is 
both massive and disturbing. In any case, what is involved 
is a theoretical proposal of  cross-operators that, in a de-
classifying fashion, organize worlds spanned by construc-
tions of  history and memory, many fields of  the liberal 
arts and sciences or media discourses. Such theoretical 
operators would have to be incorporated either by forc-
ing or replacing and eliminating the hierarchical or reduc-
tive functions of  the traditional operators of  classifica-
tions, thesauri and ontologies. 
What is understood here as an operator is a logical-
semantic transversal tool (and, it should not be forgotten, 
of  a necessarily ethical and political nature), whose pri-
mordial function involves establishing relationships be-
tween registers and serving as a link between these and the 
participants in a network. For instance, the hierarchical 
tools BT, NT and associative RT, belonging to conven-
tional thesauri, are operators of  organization that satisfy 
precise, unequivocal and symmetric epistemological crite-
ria. 
The basic difference of  these types of  closed and uni-
valent operators, with respect to this proposal, lies in the 
logics on which they are based. Declassifying operators 
are precisely resources of  intervention and facilitation 
whose aim is to guarantee decolonizing thought and the 
equal flow of  information systems, but also to warn citi-
zens about those registers that contravene interculturally 
established decisions and agreements, such as human 
rights, to question certain presences by means of  the le-
gitimate criticism of  producers-mediators and users-
mediators, and to promote a social transformation keyed 
to emancipation and plurality of  knowledge. 
On being open, the logic of  the operators proposed 
here includes the closed logic of  the traditional relational 
operators BT, NT, and RT, or any other one, and as a re-
sult it does not oppose them provided that they contain 
the principles of  declassification. So, for example, under 
declassification we could continue to use operators of  
classive and partitive hierarchies, whole/part and 
genre/specie, subject to the extirpation of  their logic of  
subordination and supra-ordering as a primary systemic 
logic, operating as mere partial resources of  proximity, 
provided that they do not stem from the reproduction of  
epistemological, social or hegemonic political hierarchies 
without alternative voices. 
The declassification of  KO systems in the aforemen-
tioned sectors could have an anti-dogmatic, hermeneutic 
and decolonizing operator, that is, based on the imperative 
of  the direct democratic participation of  all the possible 
positions and worlds that need it—including all the opposi-
tions and contradictions regarding a conception—
construed in a plural fashion so as to ensure the presence 
of  all worldviews and propitiate the differences even of  
those positions regarded as unjust or anti-democratic. Un-
der the priority of  ideological and logical pluralism, but 
also facilitating part of  that established in the principles of  
interaction and transformation that orientate the promo-
tion of  social change, the complex operator Λ (Lambda) is 
proposed (named after Morin’s complexity). Such an op-
erator would be essential, for instance, in conceptual maps 
in which appear complex notions like terrorism, veil, ‘ille-
gal’ people or abortion, to mention only a few of  the most 
controversial ones. Operator Λ would guarantee all the 
ideological interpretations and equal opportunities of  
those concepts. The complex operator is not designed to 
intervene in or control visions and meanings as regards an 
issue (see García Gutiérrez 2008, 2011a, 2011c). 
Furthermore, an anti-relativist operator would act in a 
compensatory fashion, that is, it would side against injus-
tices and inequalities established in the exomemory, in-
tervene in the conflicts of  interest between local posi-
tions and inter-ideological agreements, establish condi-
tions for dialogue keyed to consensus, and apply the re-
sults of  the latter. Transcultural operator V, as a result of  
an inter-cultural or inter-ideological agreement, would be 
responsible for those functions (see García Gutiérrez 
2007, 2008, 2011a, 2011c). 
Let us look at several clarifying issues touching on the 
shared and different aspects in both operators, operators 
that do not oppose each other, but intersect, supervise 
and complement each other. Complex operator Λ, whose 
most notable function would be to detect confrontations, 
contradictions, oppositions, dichotomies and antonymies 
in pursuit of  their coexistence, includes all the possible 
meanings of  an issue or the meaning of  unshared issues, 
specifying them so that all participations or searches in 
the network are recognized by the shared subjectivities of  
a community or culture or by individual subjectivities. It 
is therefore an operator closer to ‘de facto multiculturalism’ 
(Olivé 1999), to an initial co-presence of  positions in 
equal conditions and with the same chance of  visibility. 
With regard to transcultural operator V, it is the syn-
thetic product of  a permanently open, democratic dia-
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logue between representations of  diverse positions (po-
litical, cultural, discursive, etc.) that negotiate the ho-
mologation and integration of  certain issues that affect 
them from argument premises (and not mere arguments) 
or topoi. Therefore, this operator V implies the reaching 
of  an agreement with respect to an issue and its formal-
ization as a category transversal to the positions as a 
trans-category, constituting, from such a sanction, an 
ethical world norm that could interfere in the local regis-
ters that infringe it, not invalidating or censoring them, 
since they would always enjoy the protection offered by 
the complex operator, but warning the participating citi-
zens about their content. 
Both operators are profoundly democratic, since when 
Λ is supported by the specification of  all the positions 
and worldviews, without exclusion, as itineraries of  rep-
resentation and localization of  the registers, namely, guar-
anteeing the representativeness on an equal footing of  all 
the initial positions with respect to an issue, V is essen-
tially regulative and executive, that is, it balances the pos-
sible unjust treatment of  some or other position in the 
network, even respecting the presence of  such registers 
accommodating the prior principle of  emancipation, in 
terms of  a interculturally accepted categorical scale in 
such a way that abuses in the network do not go unpun-
ished if  the transcultural community can avoid it with 
alerts, warnings and recriminations. As a result, the 
transcultural operator is as fully democratic as the com-
plex operator, since its application would only be author-
ized by democratic decision (transcultural synthesis) en-
dorsed by the majority of  the positions, a consensus that 
can be widened and must be revised periodically. 
While the transcultural operator is the antidote to the 
relativism of  which the complex operator could be ac-
cused, which does not determine the moral or cultural 
merits of  a register, concept or position, the complex op-
erator likewise involves the democratic and hermeneutic 
balance of  a transcultural operator accused of  lack of  
support or sufficient legitimization. If  the complex op-
erator leads all the positions and perspectives to mutual 
friction from which emerge third itineraries, spontaneous 
and deliberate new connivances, the transcultural opera-
tor is substance of  a dialogical rationality in pursuit of  
convergence. 
The complex operator is linked at a systemic level, that 
is, to an epistemography (García Gutiérrez 1998) as a 
concept network or open system. The complete visibility 
of  the democratic function of  this operator only appears 
at the system level, and not in each particular register. As 
to transcultural operator V, even performing at a systemic 
level as well, its complete realization is only achieved 
when it is specifically assigned to a register affecting the 
provided analytic description by means of  other re-
sources used by the position and local interest. However, 
its efficiency lies in a constant activism by intercultural 
dialogues and the adequate use to which it is put by cul-
turally and socially committed mediators. 
In his discourse ethics, Otto Apel (1996) put forward a 
set of  six conditions for free and open dialogue, the first 
restriction being the only one inspired by moral concerns 
and the other five being rational: 
 
– All parties should mutually regard each other as their 
equal and the same consideration should be given to 
the positions of  all of  the participants. 
– The absence of  direct restrictions and indirect institu-
tional or structural pressures. 
– The only admissible form of  persuasion should be ra-
tional argument. 
– No proposition should be exempt from questioning. 
– Propositions are only accepted if  all of  the parties are 
in agreement. 
– Dialogue is open and no authority shall be able to de-
clare that a conclusion is foregone forevermore. 
 
However, Apelian discourse ethics depend on the good-
will of  the parties who, in the case of  exomemory or-
ganization, have something more to defend than their 
own personal interests, the interests of  a plural memory, 
and they have to be aware of  the unlimited manipulation 
that totalitarian propaganda of  the dominant power in 
each culture has tended to apply to language—to which 
must be added the fact of  the difficulty of  making deci-
sions on issues linked to emotions. That would be suffi-
cient reason to adopt anti-eristic measures (see Shopen-
hauer 2013; García Gutiérrez 2011c). 
The interlocutors-translators in KO, yet another part 
of  global cultural production, should have at hand a 
mechanism that guarantees confidence, beyond ethical 
claims, based on the following table summarizing the ac-
knowledgements and rights that must be accepted by all 
of  the parties involved in the dialogic activity, after being 
thoroughly trained in transcultural dialectics (see García 
Gutiérrez 2005): 
 
– Acknowledging the possible existence of  other out-
looks on an issue. 
– Acknowledging the possibility of  conversing about 
any issue. 
– Acknowledging the possibility of  being in the wrong. 
– Acknowledging the possibility of  changing positions 
(in the face of  the most convincing argument). 
 
These principles, however, do not prevent the following 
demands being made through loyalty to the position or 
representation of  each interlocutor: 
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– The right that all positions be acknowledged. 
– The right to defend any position through dialogue. 
– The right of  each interlocutor to change position. 
 
The interlocutors represent emotionally, but above all ra-
tionally, a collective position and, by virtue of  that ration-
ality which has to prevail for dialogue and consensus to 
be possible, should be capable of  undertaking the sym-
bolically flexible tasks listed below in order of  increasing 
difficulty: 
 
– Simulating a self-critical and reflexive attitude towards 
all cultural positions. 
– Identifying each position (with respect to a controversial 
issue, for example) in a hermeneutic range whose poles 
are occupied by the initially most conflicting positions. 
– Self- and alter-classifying in the same schema, analyzing 
the discordance between possible variations of  place. 
– Identifying potential common ground and premises of  
arguments, a point that will be further addressed below. 
– Identifying the degree to which the parties are willing to 
make concessions in the first and following instances. 
– Possessing in-depth knowledge of  contrary positions, 
which should be sufficiently solid and extensive so as to 
convincingly rebut the other interlocutors’ arguments. 
– Being able to simulate a contrary position versus their 
own (thinking from the ‘other side’ of  the frontier) 
should they possess in-depth knowledge of  the diverg-
ing position. 
– Simulating third-party, intermediate and eclectic posi-
tions as possible common ground or for aligning posi-
tions initially far-removed. In the absence of  dialogue, 
simulating hyper-national, hypo-national and anational, 
believer and agnostic, oppressor and oppressed, tradi-
tional and rebellious perspectives on the same issue, 
like for example violence, abortion, the veil, feminism, 
nationalism, culture, military intervention, education. 
Self-monitoring the replies given on hundreds of  po-
litical issues from all possible dichotomies so as to 
then dismantle the same dichotomies and occupy in-
terstitial positions. Declassifying mediators should be 
trained for any type of  simulation in the changing en-
vironment of  global transculture. 
– Modifying the perspectives of  positions on a polemic 
subject: for instance, if  subthemes of  the subject are 
negotiated, surpassing that level by introducing a dis-
cussion on other more abstract or general categories. 
Non-distractive versatility and transversality define an 
essential quality of  transcultural interlocutors. 
– Rotating positions in defence and demolition of  ab-
stract categories constructed in relation to a theme. 
 
The test of  alterization pretends in some way to achieve 
the same objectives of  social justice that John Rawls (1971) 
searched for with his theoretical conception of  ‘original 
position’. Once this hurdle has been overcome, transcul-
tural interlocutors will be trained to defend general princi-
ples and rights with the same vigour as their own particular 
positions. 
Establishing dialogue, however, will not be possible 
without the following determinations and conditions: 
 
– Recognizing imbalances, injustices, the cloaking and si-
lencing of  issues, categories or positions on issues by 
several qualified interlocutors. In this regard, the inter-
vention of  the interlocutors should be proprio motu, as 
well as including rational claims of  discrimination that 
could affect positions. 
– Recognizing the unquestionable need to arrive at 
agreements on an issue after thorough deliberation 
that includes consulting other representatives of  the 
positions themselves and other non-represented posi-
tions. After building a consensus, all possible represen-
tations would have to be involved, including leeway for 
those that do not yet exist or have yet to be expressed, 
by virtue of  the transcultural operator’s openness to 
the future. 
– Recognizing the tópoi of  each position and creating an 
inventory of  tópoi that facilitates subsequent transcul-
tural translation. 
 
In his diatopic hermeneutics, Boaventura Santos (2005) 
does indeed restore the ancient concept of  tópoi to which 
he attributed a powerful practical dimension. Historians, 
anthropologists, social researchers in general, and knowl-
edge organizers in this instance, are prone to carrying out 
drastic reductions of  the world and, especially, the ‘world 
of  others’. In this sense, customs, systems, cultures and 
even complete civilizations are consumed by implacable 
metonymic reductions. In the case of  contemporary cul-
tures, the reduction of  the other to the ‘common Western 
place’ is habitually practised with astonishing naturalness, 
but, in spite of  the damage done to its material and sym-
bolic universe, that ‘other’ is present and could also be ca-
pable of  defending itself. Reduction, however, would be ir-
reversible and unavoidable if  it were practised on cultures, 
practices or knowledge of  another time, even if  these cor-
respond to the life experiences of  our own now absent an-
cestors. 
Diatopic hermeneutics advocates for the construction 
of  nuanced premises or tópoi (plural of  tópos), prior to the 
construction of  the arguments themselves of  a dialogue 
(since, in reality, the analysis of  other cultures or, by exten-
sion, sensibilities should be based on dialogic criteria), both 
for that of  contemporary cultures and those that have al-
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ready disappeared. The tópoi would be agreed (or agreed in 
a simulated way) pre-dialogic places on the basis of  which 
it were possible to establish arguments and, therefore, 
guarantees of  dialogue and an approximation to equal op-
portunities. What would not be involved, then, is the lineal 
translation of  the other, as colonial anthropology did, but 
to give it a voice that makes an authentic cultural transla-
tion possible (see Santos 2005, Ch. 5). The opportunities 
for research and practice of  this procedure open up prom-
ising and innovative possibilities for democratic KO. 
 
4.3 Paraconsistent strategies 
 
The dichotomic wellspring is inexhaustible and we are as-
suming that behind each dichotomy (of  all thought, then) 
there is a contradiction. The universe of  available contra-
dictions is immense and, nevertheless, insufficient for the 
objectives of  this offensive: contradiction does not exist in 
nature (or maybe it does, although we will always be in the 
dark), but is a merely epistemological issue. It is us humans 
of  a specific cultural axiology, possibly, at this very mo-
ment, all humans are yoked to transculture, who see con-
tradiction in all that surrounds us, in others and in our-
selves. The contradiction that emanates from an opposi-
tion can be as artificial as the opposition itself, although it 
could provide an unexplored post-epistemological space. 
Settling for demonstrating contradictions in discourse 
or third-party actions is a fairly unproductive exercise: 
however much Marx scientifically demonstrated the de-
mise of  capitalism, based on its internal contradictions, 
he seems to have got his predictions wrong. It is possible 
that the end of  capitalism can only be verified together 
with the extinction of  the human race on a devastated 
planet. Declassification would not, therefore, waste time 
censuring contradictions: one of  its procedures would 
consist in using them to discover the world, acknowledg-
ing their undeniable constitutive role. 
Let us now have a look at three theoretical strategies 
of  declassification (see García Gutiérrez 2011b, 2013) as 
a mode of  paraconsistent knowledge, going beyond the 
limits of  the three principles of  conventional logic that 
govern us and restoring a calculated contradiction as a 
post-epistemological resource: 
 
4.3.1 Strategy 1 
 
Every instance possesses an open regime and can be as 
well as another or multiple instance, beyond the possibili-
ties of  poly-hierarchies. An infinite number of  notional 
interweavings stalk instances, configurating and recon-
figurating propositions in a syntagmatic axis (that of  
grammatical combinations, for structuralism) which de-
vours paradigmatic verticality. No property is essential for 
a concept, nor does it have to be favoured over the rest. 
Specifically, William James warned ([1927] 1995, II: 333, 
335): “There is no property absolutely essential to any 
one thing.... The essence of  a thing is that one of  its 
properties which is so important for my interests that in 
comparison with it I may neglect the rest.” 
When we make allusions using an automatism of  the 
parts, classes, properties or functions of  a house or car, of  
an institution, city, computer or citizens, we are classifying 
the world in an essentialist way. The verb to be connects, 
explicitly or tacitly, the part with its whole, the class with its 
species: the wheel (is) of  the car, the screen (is) of  the 
computer, the kitchen (is) of  the house, the house is a 
dwelling, sardines are fish, the computer is technology, Jim 
is a lawyer, etc. These essentialist operations involve orga-
nizing the world on the basis of  a unicist and reducing 
logic, since it asserts by denying or concealing the possible 
worlds that modal logic invokes and, above all, the factual 
worlds. That practical logic is a resource of  conventional 
classification. 
Therefore, the declassified formula would be as follows: 
an instance not only is (itself), it also always is (another in-
stance). We will call this first synthesized formula: strategy 
of  ontological extension. On extending the limits of  the 
essence, this strategy deletes them, depurifies, hybridizes, 
contaminates imaginary essences, opens and devaluates hi-
erarchies. Its aim is to contest the sacred principle of  iden-
tity: A=A and the abolition of  conceptual submission to 
assumed supra-conceptual instances. Here are several de-
classifying arguments: A is never equal to itself, inasmuch 
as the logic of  change impedes the permanence of  a state. 
The representation of  A would be equal to itself  outside 
time, but outside temporality there is neither a conception 
of  A nor any conception at all. A would be a representa-
tion of  something outside A which is not A. It is still A but 
simultaneously it is not A anymore. Hierarchy is a conven-
tional ordering of  concepts and, therefore, responds to an 
epistemological order, given that it is not ‘natural’ and not 
even interculturally-shared. 
 
4.3.2 Strategy 2 
 
What will be addressed now is a second formula derived 
from the first: if  an instance not only is (itself), but also 
always is (another instance), then it is also plausible that it 
is not in other possible worlds and, in at least one of  
them, it would necessarily not be. The possibilities of  
not-to-be flow through the possibilities of  to be, and I 
put special emphasis on the plural: possibilities of  not-to-
be. It is common knowledge that there exist numerous 
manifestations of  to be, introduced by is also, perchance 
as many possibilities as enunciative situations and, never-
theless, it is for being unaware of  the domain of  not-to-
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be that we can credit the not-to-be with only one abso-
lute possibility: simply not-to-be. Not-to-be is a product 
of  the insufficiency or the perceptive reductionism of  the 
essentialist conscience and, therefore, very likely as volu-
ble, elastic and reversible as the fact of  to be and with 
many other ineffable properties that cannot be said or 
said yet (such as emptiness or nothingness, a world that 
begins to be ‘said’ by subatomic physics). And all without 
prejudice to the possibility that the denied (by the not-to-
be) might be much more complex than the asserted 
world (by the to-be). 
By deconditioning and making the counterfactual 
mode implicit6 (Lewis 1973), we deduce from the argu-
ment  
 
if  an instance not only is, but also always is, then it 
would not necessarily be in at least one possible 
world 
 
the second synthetic formula: an instance that also always 
is (another instance), also is not (itself) in at least a possi-
ble world. We will call this second hypothesis: strategy of  
necessary contradiction. The aim of  this strategy is to re-
fute and force the transgression, overcoming the last con-
trary epistemic resistance, of  the classic principle of  con-
tradiction. Let us now analyze this using some previous 
examples: the centre is also not the centre; the periphery 
is also not the periphery; the North is also not the North; 
the South is also not the South; the beautiful is also not 
beautiful; the ugly is also not ugly; the faithful is also not 
faithful, the unfaithful is also not unfaithful, etc. 
 
4.3.3 Strategy 3 
 
Lastly, we will call a third declassifying formula a strategy 
of  dissolutive superposition, which acts upon cases 
that permit a simultaneous vision of  the two poles of  di-
chotomy: To be or not to be, is now not the question, 
rather it would be: to be and not to be. An: either is or is 
not instance, the principle of  excluded third, introduces a 
dualist rift in the very foundations of  thought. To pro-
pose—and enforce—that an instance could be and not 
be at the same time, on multiple occasions, repairs it. 
We would then be simultaneously rational and irra-
tional (without complementarily opposing or conceiving 
such instances), judges and the judged, educators and the 
educated, predators and the preyed on (however much 
positivist training stubbornly holds the opposite, the 
flood of  meaning inundates everything). Yet we would be 
much more by applying hyperbatic inversion: observers 
observed and not just observed observers; dominators 
dominated and not only dominated dominators. This cir-
cumstance would not exclusively affect human roles, but 
also physical qualities or any other instance or property 
that could be susceptible to paraconsistency: attractive 
and ugly; tall and short; generous and egoist. The surface 
is deep and deepness superficial: abyssal creatures are ex-
actly where they should be—at what inverse depth would 
a boat be for them? The North is always South and the 
West is also the East. On the planet, in outer space, and 
especially in the quantum world, to go up, to go down, to 
be or not to be, is only a matter of  narrative, of  enuncia-
tors and addressee. Bifurcations and biases are products 
of  perspective and situations. An instance does not have 
any more value than that which its ‘instant’ ascribes it, or 
any more meaning than that which an immovable per-
spective, and therefore dogmatic, closed, impossible (and 
contradictory) in itself, endows it. 
As to hierarchy, the main logical (and political) archi-
tecture of  the conventional classification of  the world, 
with its opposing base, declassification would break with 
all/part and specie/gender on regarding them as a variety 
of  asymmetric dichotomy. And the same would happen 
with the submission of  adjectives and properties to 
nouns and other assumed cognitive foundations. In de-
classified thought, all essences would be exchangeable 
and soluble, all concepts precarious and negotiable. 
A red car would not only be essentially a car, but also 
essentially red. Nouns would have to lose their secular 
privileges over quality: the red car is a good representative 
of  the field of  vehicles, but also of  redness and many 
implicit properties and extensions in the red car notion: 
of  the parts, components and functions of  all cars and 
also the genealogy that has led it to be what it is and what 
the subjective term encyclopaedia represents: an example 
of  modernity, development, pollution, etc. We might only 
pay attention to a car due to the intensity of  its colour, 
because it is metallic, noisy or goes fast, something that 
would devalue, from that perspective, the paradigmatic 
status of  the concept of  car itself, while at the same time 
it would syntagmatically enrich it with perspectives, quali-
ties and nuances from our particular encyclopaedia of  as-
sociations. Commonly, nouns have occupied a centrality 
that cloaks adjective, peripheral thought. Hence, one of  
the priorities of  declassification is to restore all that ‘sec-
ondary’ apparatus of  language. 
 
5.0 Protrepticus of  declassification 
 
It is the obligation of  a determined vanguard of  KO, 
without complexes, opportunisms or fears, to address 
(de)classification, whatever its field of  action, with the 
same objective borrowed from Holloway (2010): to 
change the world without taking power. 
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1.  A seemingly contradictory central Hegelian concept 
that simultaneously means to uplift, abolish, cancel or 
suspend (Hegel, 2009) and which forms the basis of  
Hegel’s dialectic method. 
2.  Although the word aesthetics originally stems from ais-
thesis—the art of  sensitivity—it was soon used specifi-
cally to refer to the study of  forms and the beautiful, 
ending up subjecting and anesthetizing its initial pur-
pose. 
3.  Hierarchy of  credibility is an expression introduced by 
Howard S. Becker (1967). Those at the top of  organi-
zations or societies are seen to be more credible than 
those at the bottom. 
4.  In our contemporary civilization, we tend to have no 
qualms about making decisions affecting our grand-
children, but we do not accept that our grandparents 
have previously decided for us. 
5.  How can language resist inhumanity, brutality? If  lit-
erature, philosophy, the liberal arts… are powerless to 
detain barbarity, why then educate? (Mèlich 1998, 171-
189); to which I naturally add: Why then research or 
think? 
6.  Namely, the enunciation privileged by the modal logic 
of  possible worlds and which we adopt here, for exam-
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